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Pursuant to this Court’s Order entered August 5, 2016, Respondent Holly Refining
& Marketing Company—Woods Cross LLC n/k/a HollyFrontier Woods Cross Refining
LLC (“Holly”) respectfully submits this Supplemental Brief to address the standard of
review applicable in this case in light of this Court’s recent decision in Ellis-Hall
Consultants v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 2016 UT 34, __ P.3d __.
DISCUSSION
Prior to Ellis-Hall, when this matter was briefed before the Utah Court of Appeals,
there was a lack of clarity in this Court’s precedent regarding what standard of review
applies to questions of statutory interpretation when the Legislature has granted an
administrative agency discretion to interpret its own governing statutes and regulations.
As recently as 2012, this Court held that because the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining had
been given “explicit authority and wide latitude in interpreting the operative provisions of
the Mining Act,” the Board’s “legal conclusions and interpretations of the Mining Act”
can be set aside “only if those conclusions are ‘based upon a clearly erroneous
interpretation or application of the law.’” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil,
Gas, & Mining (“Sierra Club v. BOGM”), 2012 UT 73, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d 291. 1

See also LPI Servs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶¶ 8-9, 215 P.3d 135 (“The legislature may
grant an agency discretion, either explicitly or implicitly, to interpret specific statutory
terms.”); Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 18, 38
P.3d 291 (in reviewing an agency’s “‘interpretation of the operative provisions of the
statutory law it is empowered to administer, [agency] findings must be rationally based
and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the
tolerable limits of reason’” (quoting Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 754 P.2d 41, 50
(Utah 1988))); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991) (it is
1
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In 2013, this Court decided Murray v. Utah Labor Commission, 2013 UT 38, 308
P.3d 461, which applied a correctness standard of review to questions of an agency’s
statutory interpretation and held that the mere delegation of authority to administer
statutes and regulations does not require deference to an agency’s interpretation of those
statutes and regulations under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Id. ¶ 28.
Although Murray implied that this conclusion might reach further to cases involving an
explicit delegation of discretion (because questions of statutory interpretation involve no
“discretion,” id. ¶¶ 30-33), Murray did not expressly overrule cases such as Sierra Club
v. BOGM, where there was such an explicit delegation.
Though not exactly the same as the statute in Sierra Club v. BOGM, the statute at
issue in this appeal, Utah Code § 19-1-301.5, does contain an explicit delegation of
discretion to the agency. It states that “[d]uring judicial review of a dispositive action,
the appellate court shall: (i) review all agency determinations in accordance with
Subsection 63G-4-403(4), recognizing that the agency has been granted substantial
discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules….” Id. § 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(i)
(2016). 2 In its brief submitted below, Holly relied on this statute and the cases granting
deference where there is an explicit delegation of discretion in arguing that questions of

“appropriate to grant the agency deference [on statutory interpretation] on the basis of an
explicit or implicit grant of discretion contained in the governing statute”).
This citation is to the current version of the statute. The statute was amended in 2015,
but the amendment did not change this provision. 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 378 (S.B. 282).
The prior citation was Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(14)(c)(i) (2014).

2
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law regarding the Division of Air Quality’s (“Division”) governing statutes and
regulations should be reviewed deferentially. (Holly Resp. Br. pp. 12-13.)
In Ellis-Hall, this Court brought more clarity to this area of the law and expressly
“repudiate[d] our prior decisions calling for deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own orders or regulatory enactments.” Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 28. This conclusion
was based on the holding that Murray had overruled these prior cases and required “nondeferential ‘correctness’ review of agency conclusions of law.” Id. ¶ 24. Although EllisHall, like Murray, did not involve an explicit delegation of discretion, this Court again
implied that such a delegation may be ineffective because “‘[s]tatutory interpretation
does not present such a discretionary decision,’ and thus is not subject to deferential
review.” Id. ¶ 26 (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes Gen. Contractors v. Utah
Labor Comm’n, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 n.4, 322 P.3d 712). As a result, this Court concluded
that when an agency “interprets the law in the course of fulfilling its governmental
functions, it is ultimately subject to judicial review without deference by the courts.” Id.
¶ 32 n.4.
Despite the broad language of Ellis-Hall, its narrower holding does not necessarily
extend to this case. Neither Murray, Hughes, nor Ellis-Hall involved an explicit
delegation by the Legislature granting an agency “substantial discretion to interpret its
governing statutes and rules,” as this case does. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(i). That
provision does not just refer to an agency “interpret[ing] the law in the course of fulfilling
its governmental functions.” Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 32 n.4. It deals expressly with
judicial review of those interpretations. And Ellis-Hall acknowledges that “deference to
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agencies is limited to circumstances prescribed by statute or required by our caselaw.”
Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶ 26 (emphasis added). That is what Section 301.5(15)(c)(i)
plainly requires.
To avoid this statutory delegation, this Court would have to conclude that the
provision was of no effect because “‘questions of law … ha[ve] a single ‘right’ answer,’”
and therefore “[s]tatutory interpretation does not present such a discretionary decision.”
Hughes, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 n.4 (first alteration in original) (quoting Murray, 2014 UT 3, ¶
33). But this Court often observes that there can be more than one reasonable
interpretation of a statute, and thus a possible basis for saying that picking one
interpretation over another involves a measure of expertise or “discretion.” See, e.g., LPI
Servs., 2009 UT 41, ¶ 9 (“‘[W]hen there is more than one permissible reading of the
statute and no basis in the statutory language or legislative history to prefer one
interpretation over another ... [t]he agency that has been granted authority to administer
the statute is the appropriate body to’ interpret it.” (quoting Morton, 814 P.2d at 588-89));
State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, ¶ 34, 309 P.3d 209 (“Having identified two reasonable
interpretations of the statutory text, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous.”).
Declining to extend Ellis-Hall to cases involving express statutory delegations of
discretion would also conform to one of this Court’s cardinal canons of statutory
construction—that “‘we must give effect to every provision of a statute and avoid an
interpretation that will render portions of a statute inoperative.’” Thayer v. Washington
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 2012 UT 31, ¶ 12, 285 P.3d 1142 (quoting Warne v. Warne, 2012 UT

4848-2883-5385

4

13, ¶ 36, 275 P.3d 238). Finding the Legislature’s express delegation of agency
discretion ineffective as a matter of law would render Section 301.5(15)(c)(i) a nullity.
That leaves only the issue of whether the Legislature may constitutionally dictate a
standard of review for appeals of agency actions consistent with the separation of powers,
an issue raised by Ellis-Hall in dicta. 2016 UT 34, ¶¶ 32-33 & n.4. Although this Court
need not resolve this issue here for the reasons explained below, there is a distinction
between the Legislature’s powers in the context of agency review, as opposed to cases
that invoke the courts’ original constitutional jurisdiction. Except for proceedings
involving extraordinary writs, the jurisdiction of the courts to review agency actions is
entirely a creature of statute. As this Court has explained, “[i]n the absence of a specific
statute granting us jurisdiction over a writ of review from an agency proceeding, we have
no jurisdiction.” S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bd. of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233, 234 (Utah 1992). 3 Upholding the Legislature’s ability to control the scope of
appellate review of agency decisions—a power reserved to it by the Utah Constitution—
would therefore arguably preserve, rather than undermine, the separation of powers.

See also DeBry v. Salt Lake Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(“[T]he jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the district court’s appellate jurisdiction
must be provided by statute…. [UAPA] defines the outermost limits of our appellate
jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency decisions only when the legislature expressly
authorizes a right of review.”); Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3 (Supreme Court has “appellate
jurisdiction … to be exercised as provided by statute”); id. § 5 (district court has
“appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute”); Utah Code § 78A-3-102 (statutory grant
of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction); id. § 63G-4-102(8) (“Nothing in this chapter
may be interpreted to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction to review final agency
action.”).

3
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Nonetheless, Holly acknowledges the seemingly broad language in Ellis-Hall that
statutory interpretation does not involve “discretion,” and that all agency interpretations
of the law are “ultimately subject to judicial review without deference by the courts.”
Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, ¶¶ 26, 32 n.4. If this Court intended that language to sweep more
broadly than cases involving the mere delegation of authority to administer statutes and
regulations, and decides to extend Ellis-Hall to cases like this one where the Legislature
has made an explicit delegation of discretion to an agency to interpret its own statutes
and regulations, Holly accepts that the standard of review in this case for questions of law
and for mixed questions that are entirely law-like would be correctness.
Ultimately, however, this question should not matter to this Court’s decision on
the merits. There are only a handful of issues in this case that can properly be
characterized as pure questions of law or mixed questions that are entirely law-like.
Those issues are the following:
• Whether the Division was required by law to use the AP-42 emission factors to
estimate particulate matter emissions. (See Holly’s Resp. Br., Arg. §§ II(A) pp.
25-27; and II(C)(3) pp. 35-36.)
• Whether the Division was allowed to use historical emissions inventory data for
the propane pit flare in its netting analysis. (Id. § III p. 37.)
• Whether the Division must include upset emissions in potential-to-emit (PTE)
calculations for refinery flares or in NAAQS modeling. (Id. §§ V(A) pp. 42-45;
and V(B) pp. 48-49.)
• Whether the Division must include short-term emissions limits in an approval
order for a minor modification. (Id. § V(C) pp. 50-51.)
• Whether the full text of Subpart Ja must be included in an approval order. (Id. §
VI pp. 51-53.)
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Regardless of whether these issues are reviewed for correctness or abuse of
discretion, none of them are close calls. Petitioners have not advanced any reasonable
contrary interpretation of the laws governing these issues; they have simply disagreed
with what the laws allow from a policy perspective. As Holly has already discussed at
length in its initial Response Brief, this case is not about whether the Utah Legislature is
doing enough to combat air pollution. It is simply about whether the Approval Order
issued by the Division complies with the law. Because the Approval Order is consistent
in all respects with the requirements of Utah’s air quality laws, the Executive Director’s
decision should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of October 2016.
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

/s/ David C. Reymann
Steven J. Christiansen
David C. Reymann
Cheylynn Hayman
Megan J. Houdeshel
Attorneys for Holly Refining & Marketing
Company – Woods Cross, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of October 2016, I served two copies of
the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF HOLLY REFINING AND
MARKETING CO. via U.S. Mail on the following:
Joro Walker (joro.walker@westernresources.org)
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr. (rob.dubuc@westernresources.org)
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES
150 South 600 East, Suite 2A
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Christian C. Stephens (cstephens@utah.gov)
Marina Thomas (mthomas@utah.gov)
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL & HEALTH DIVISION
195 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

/s/ David C. Reymann
David C. Reymann
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